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In this paper we present a model that describes how historical po-
litical constraints by themselves, or in combination with a suﬃcient
degree of impatience, may be the cause of bankruptcy in some indus-
tries when a closed economy is opened to foreign competition. The
model assesses the behavior of two types of ﬁrms, impatient and pa-
tient, which may or may not adopt foreign technology. The costs
involved are not only economic but also political. These political
costs are, nonetheless, measured in monetary terms. At some mo-
ment, which depends on the political constraints, a third ﬁrm enters
the market, the foreign one. Depending on the national ﬁrms’ degree
of impatience and the costs associated with political constraints, Nash
equilibria, in which one or even both ﬁrms–at the moment the econ-
omy is opened–have to shut down, exist. All these strategies result to
be subgame perfect equilibrium. Further, as a by-product, our results
shed new light on the topic of temporary protection: The degree of im-
patience, by itself, my be the reason of why temporary protection may
o may not fail to induce ﬁrms to adopt advanced technologies, even
if the threat of liberalization is credible; furthermore, if both ﬁrms
are suﬃciently patient, both ﬁrms adopt the new technology and tem-
porary protection results to be operative in order to maximize social
1welfare, so this equilibrium pass the “renegotiation-proof” criterium
(along the equilibrium path).
1 Introduction
Historical evidence suggests that protectionist trade policies are often the
result of a complex interaction between unions, ﬁrms, and the government.
When a new labor-saving and cost reducing technology appears in the in-
ternational scenario, these three actors may ﬁnd themselves better oﬀ in
the short run by maintaining the technology employed by the industry un-
changed. This is the case when speciﬁc economic, ﬁnancial, and political
conditions, make them face as an alternative: unemployment, widespread
bankruptcies, and social unrest. Yet every time the decision to change the
technology and modernize the industry is postponed, the problem for the
future worsens. If, at a given moment, the status quo was maintained for
fear of unemployment and of ﬁrms’ bankruptcies, as the gap between the
technology used by the domestic industry and that in the industry’s leaders
elsewhere in the world widens, the danger of widespread unemployment and
bankruptcies in the industry only increases. Thus, when the decision to mod-
ernize the industry and open up the economy is ﬁnally taken the industry is
hard hit.
The history of the Mexican textile industry closely ﬁts this description
of events as is shown in Gómez-Galvarriato (2001). The comparison of pro-
duction costs c. 1911 of one of the most modern and productive ﬁrms (the
Compañía Industrial Veracruzana S.A.), with its international counterparts
suggest that by that time the ﬁrm could compete with English cloth prices
(although not with American cloth prices). Yet as time went by its com-
petitive standing deteriorated as a result of legally binding industry wide
collective contracts that hindered the ﬁrm from adopting new technology.
The ﬁrst “wage-list” was signed by ﬁrms’ and workers’ representatives in
1912. Yet it did not become legally binding until 1927 when as a result of
the Convention of Workers and Industrialists of 1925-27, a collective contract
was agreed with basically the same technical features as that of 1912. This
collective contract ﬁxed the maximum number of machines per worker and es-
tablished speciﬁc wages-per-piece. Under these conditions, industrialists had
no incentive to introduce better machinery because it would not enable them
to reduce labor costs, since wages-per-piece and the workers-per-machine had
2to remain invariable. It set, for example, the maximum number of looms per
weaver to 6, when using Nortrhop automatic looms a weaver could tend 20.
It also required that the companies maintained ﬁxed the number and type of
jobs they provided. The 1925-27 Convention agreements may be understand-
able under the circumstances of worldwide depression in the textile industry.
Nevertheless, the precepts adopted were ratiﬁed over and over again, without
any changes until at least 1951, and until 1972 with few modiﬁcations. It was
not until 1994, that the industry-wide collective contract in this industry was
abolished. Company documents tell on the diﬃculties ﬁrms faced to install
modern machinery, as a result of these regulations, making it many times
simply impossible. These agreements were, of course, paralleled by rises in
tariﬀs that the government carried out in order for the status quo to prevail.
When tariﬀs were reduced after 1985 few of these ﬁrms survived.
Whereas the case of the Mexican spinning and weaving industry may
be an extreme example of a sector institutionally tied down in order not to
modernize, we believe this story is not exceptional, but a pattern experienced,
in a lesser or greater degree, by several industries in many of the developing
countries which have recently opened-up their economies. Ana Revenga’s
(1997) study of the Mexican manufacturing during 1984-90 period indicates
that the 1985-87 trade liberalization episode aﬀected ﬁrm-level employment
and wages through several channels. It shifted down the industry product
and labor demand. This in itself may have accounted for a 3%-4% decline
in real wages on average (and for as much as 10%-14% decline in the more
aﬀected industries). Moreover, trade reform also reduced the rents available
to be captured by ﬁrms and workers. This had an additional negative eﬀect
on ﬁrm-level employment and wages.
Several papers have addressed the question of why protectionist trade
policies have failed to serve as an instrument to provide time and resources
to ﬁrms to undertake cost-reducing investments that would eventually enable
them to compete internationally. Their argument is based on the idea that
governments are unable to credibly precommit to the unconditional elimina-
tion of protection, and thus protection generates a trade-oﬀ for the ﬁrm. “If
during the program, the ﬁrm does not invest suﬃciently in cost reductions,
then it gains a renewal of future protection, and it saves the opportunity cost
of capital. It loses, however, the beneﬁts derived from cost reductions. If, at
the margin, the gains are greater than the losses, then the ﬁrm will inevitably
choose not to invest suﬃciently” (Tornell, 1991). Temporary protectionist
programs are thus “time inconsistent”. Staiger and Tabellini (1987) have
3shown that an optimal trade policy may be time inconsistent, and that a
suboptimal but time-consistent policy involves an excessive amount of pro-
tection, and that when protectionist policies are time inconsistent tariﬀsm a y
dominate production subsidies. Matsuyama (1990) has also found dynamic
inconsistency of optimal temporary protection by examining whether or not
there exists a sequence of credible government threats to liberalize in the
future which would induce the ﬁrms to invest as a sub-game perfect equilib-
rium. Although such an equilibrium exists, it fails to pass the “renegotiation-
proof” criterium and thus time-inconsistency results. Tornell (1991) shows
that “investment-contingent subsidies” do not eliminate time inconsistency
in protectionist programs. Wright (1995) shows the time inconsistency per-
sist even when the ﬁrm eﬀort and costs are publicly observable. These papers
suggest that a third party such as the GATT or an international treaty is
necessary to make the government’s threat credible and thus enable a tem-
porary protection policy to be eﬀective in terms of forcing the ﬁrms to invest
in new technology.
In this paper we address the issue of why ﬁrms may choose not to invest
in new technology even when the threat of liberalization is credible or, in
other words, they have a perfect foresight of when they will face foreign com-
petition. We suggest a theoretical approach, based on game theory, in order
to describe how historical political constraints by themselves, or in combina-
tion with a suﬃcient degree of impatience, may be the cause of bankruptcy
in some industries when a closed economy is opened to foreign competition.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II lays down the
model. Section III discusses the results of the model. Finally Section IV
concludes. All proofs are given in the Appendix.
2T h e m o d e l
The general set-up.
Time is discrete and the horizon is inﬁnite. In the economy, at the outset,
there are two ﬁrms, one impatient and one patient, characterized by their
discount factors 0 <β
I <β
P < 1 respectively. These two ﬁrms are the
players of the gahof the market are common knowledge. The foreign ﬁrm
enters the market at the moment the government opens the economy. One
comment: A ﬁrm can only face costs at each period if they produce (sell)
strictly positive quantities, implying that the credits are implicitly introduced
4into the costs that we deﬁne below. A warning. Our model cannot be thought
as a repeated game, as stage by stage the game’s structure changes.
The payoﬀ functions and strategies.
Informally, the game is such that, in each period t ≥ 0, the two national
ﬁrms choose to adopt or not to adopt the new and compete à la Cournot in
each period. They will then maximize, at time zero, the discounted sum of
the time-period proﬁts according to the costs and the corresponding discount
factors. We will deﬁne, therefore, an Extensive Game with perfect informa-
tion and simultaneous moves (see, Osborne and Rubinstein 1994). Formally,
the set of players is {I,P},w h e r eI stands for the impatient ﬁrm and P for
the patient ﬁrm. Let denote by A the set {N,T} where N stands for the
action ‘not to change the actual technology’,a n dT stands for the action ‘to
change the actual technology.’ That is, if a ﬁrm i ∈ {I,P} at t−1 is facing
costs according to some technology (the foreign or the national one), if that
ﬁrm at t decides N, it means that it has decided –for this period t–to con-
tinue with the technology that was using at t−1 and, obviously, the action T
means exactly the opposite. The set of histories H is given as follows. First
we deﬁne A = {N,T}×{ N,T} and then H = {∅}{(at)
∞
t=0 |at ∈ A, t ≥ 0}.
Given (aI
t,a P
t ) ∈ {N,T}×{ N,T}, we use the interpretation that, for any
t the ﬁrst coordinate of the pair (aI
t,a P
t ) is the action chosen by the ﬁrm I
at period t and, similarly, the second coordinate is the action chosen by the
patient ﬁrm at that period. The player function ˜ P : H → {I,P} is given by
˜ P(h) ∈ {I,P} for all h ∈ H. Therefore, the set of strategies for the player
i ∈ {I,P} is given by Si = S =
©
{sh}h∈H |sh ∈ {N,T},f o ra l lh ∈ H
ª
.
Logically, given a proﬁle of strategies
¡
sI,s P¢
∈ S × S, this pair determines





t=0,w i t hai
t ∈ {N,T} for all t ≥ 0, which in turn determines a

















t=0, and the foreign ﬁrm enters the market at ¯ t,t h e





























with i,j = I,P,w h e r eπi(Ci
t,C
j
t) is the Cournot proﬁto fﬁrm i ∈ {I,P} at
time t<¯ t, if the respective costs for that period are Ci
t and C
j








t and the foreign ﬁrm faces CF, as mentioned before.
Remark 1 According to our assumption that there are no credits, if for
ag i v e np r o ﬁle of strategies
¡
sI,s P¢





t=0 is such that a ﬁrm i ∈ {I,P} produces no positive quantities
( o r ,e q u i v a l e n t l y ,i fi td o e sn o th a v ep o s i t i v et i m e - p e r i o dp r o ﬁts)1 of the good
for t ≥ ˜ t for some for some ˜ t ≥ 0, then we say that the corresponding ﬁrm
shuts down and leaves the market at time t = ˜ t. Similarly, and once again




is such that for a ﬁrm i ∈ {I,P},t h es t r a t e g ysi prescribes
at some t the adoption of the new technology, but the time period-proﬁts
are zero at the periods in which the new technology is being adopted (from
t on), then we say that technology is not active for that ﬁrm, that is, the
corresponding ﬁrm does not have the real possibility to use the new technology,
just because, in fact, it has not covered the costs that we describe below.
Therefore, in this last situation, we assume that if the correspondign ﬁrm
decides once again to adopt the new technology in later periods, it will have
to face the costs as it were not paid anything before.
The costs.
The ﬁrms may use the extant national technology, characterized by its
constant marginal cost CN in each period, or they may adopt the new foreign
technology, characterized by CF, which is the cost that the foreign ﬁrm that
owns it has to face. If the national ﬁrms want to adopt the new technology,
they still have to face not only CF but also some additional economic and
political costs, which are described below.
• The economic costs.
The extra economic costs are exogenously given and deﬁned by a de-





t+1 for all 0 ≤ t ≤ n−1),
where Ce
n is the permanent cost that the national ﬁrm adopting the new
technology has to pay to the owner of said technology. In this way, we
capture the idea that at the beginning the economic costs are high but
decrease over time until stabilizing at the level Ce
n, which represents
1See our lemma 1 in the Appendix.
6the royalty paid to the owner of the foreign technology.2 Hence, if at
t = ¯ t the new technology is adopted, the economic costs paid by the
ﬁrm from that moment are C¯ t +t = CF + Ce
t for all 0 ≤ t ≤ n,a n d
the ﬁrm faces CF + Ce
n from t = ¯ t +n;t h a ti s ,Ct = CF + Ce
n for all
t ≥ ¯ t +n. In other words, if the foreign technology is adopted at t = ¯ t,
the sequence of costs that the ﬁrm faces is given by {Ct}
∞
t=0,w h e r e
Ct = CN for all 0 ≤ t<¯ t, Ct = CF + Ce
t for all ¯ t ≤ t<¯ t + n − 1,a n d
Ct = CF + Ce
n for all t ≥ ¯ t + n.
The time length n +1is the number of periods that a national ﬁrm
needs to completely install the new technology. After this, the ﬁrm
only has to pay the natural cost (CF)p l u st h er o y a l t y( Ce
n). It is rea-
sonable to think of these costs as decreasing, since normally installing
a new technology causes some exceptional costs at the beginning. We
assume that n>0.I fn =0 ,t h et w oﬁrms install the new technology
at t =0 ,t h e r ei sn ot r a d eo ﬀ between to install or not to install.
• The political costs.
In this paper we do not model the political process that leads to pro-
tection. We simply model this protection by assuming that there are
some costs legally imposed over a ﬁrm if it decides to adopt a foreign
technology. We call those costs political costs, which are exogenously




t=0 (l ≤∞ ).
Each C
p
t represents the extra cost that the ﬁrm has to pay if it adopts
the new technology at time t, but once and for all, due to, for instance,
t h ef a c tt h a tt h eﬁrm may have to dismiss some workers that are not
useful anymore. These costs depend on negotiations between the ﬁrms,
the government, and the trade unions. The more powerful the trade
unions are, the larger these costs would be. It would be reasonable
to assume that those costs are increasing because as the gap between
the domestic and the foreign technology widens it is likely that more
workers would be redundant when the foreign technology is adopted.
Nonetheless, without that assumption, the model can be used to as-
2An alternative interpretation for the permanent cost Ce
n can be given: The owner of
the technology is the person who produces it, and only this person. Therefore, Ce
n may
represent his proﬁts, if we understand that he is selling not the new technology but the
strategic elements to use it. These elements cannot be produced by anyone but the owner;
thus, the buyer cannot develop that new technology.
7sess situations under which those costs can become constant or even
decreasing –at least temporarily–, as it is the case in some countries
i nE u r o p e ,S p a i n ,f o re x a m p l e .3
T h er o l eo ft h eg o v e r n m e n t
The government decides the period at which the economy opens, although
it is exogenously given. At that moment, the foreign ﬁrm enters the market.
As for the domestic ﬁrms, for simplicity, we assume that when the foreign
ﬁrm enters, faces a constant marginal cost each period. Given this last
assumption, without loss of generality, we set that cost at CF. Let denote by
tg the period time at which the economy opens. As it has been expressed, the
government also plays a role, together with the ﬁrms and the trade unions, as
a party in the negotiations that determine the political costs that the ﬁrms
face if they adopt the new technology.
Technical assumptions
Some fundamentals of the economy satisfy the following general condi-
tions:4
A1 CN <a .
This is the minimal hypothesis to assume in order to make sensible the
maximization problem of the ﬁrms: It simply implies that it is possible to
produce positive quantities of the good.
A2 a − CN ≤ a−CF
2
This means that the foreign technology not only is more eﬃcient than the
national one but also that the national one is not competitive, in the sense
that it only can produce zero quentities of the good, if it competes face to
face with the foreign technology. Notice that A2 implies that CF <C N.
A3 A3.1) CN <C e





for all t<t g;A 3 . 3 )CF+a
2 >C e
n + CF.
3In Spain, the labor market has been historically very rigid, being this, perhaps, one
of the ‘causes’ of very high rates of unemployment. In any case, lately, the labor market
is more ﬂexible than in the past, allowing for temporal job and, because of this, lowering
the political cost, in our broad sense.
4In order to obtain the formal justiﬁcation of the assumptions’ interpretations, we refer
to the lemma 1 in the Appendix
8This assumption capture the following idea: The new technology is more
costly—but not too costly— than the national one at the beginning (A3.1), it
can be installed (A3.2) but, at some moment, once it is completely installed,
becomes not only more eﬃcient than the national one but also, if it used by
the two national ﬁrms, it is capable produce positive quantities even when
the economy is already opened (A3.3). We set that moment at t = n just for
simplicity. “No results change without this simpliﬁcation. Nevertheless, it
is reasonable to think of that the new technology, from the point of view of
the national ﬁr m s ,b e c o m e sm o r ee ﬃcient at the moment the costs stabilize.”
Notice that, A2 and A3.1 implies that a − (Ce
t + CF) < a−CF
2 for all 0 ≤
t ≤ n − 1 and, hence, we will have that the only way to survive, after the
economy is opened, is to have the new technology completely installed. Also,
observe that A2 and A3.3 imply that CN >C e
n + CF.
Therefore, the extensive game with perfect information that resumes our





3T h e R e s u l t s
For the sake of clarity, we ﬁrst give the intuition of a result and then we
announce formally the corresponding theorem. In this section, no proofs are
presented. All formal proofs are given in the Appendix.
The ﬁrst result responds to the following intuition. If the economy opens
too early –this is formally expresed by imposing the condition tg <n –
, or if the political costs are too high at the beginning –this is formally
expresed by the condition a − (Ce
n + CF) <C
p
t for all t ≤ tg − 1,b o t h
ﬁrms, independently of their degree of impatience, decide not to adopt the
foreign technology, because they cannot aﬀord the total costs. At the moment
the foreign ﬁrm enters the market, both national ﬁr m sh a v et os h u td o w n ,
and those decisions, if revised in the future, are not changed (there are no
advantages in do it so), given that there are no credit market opportunities.
Furthermore, at any possible history, the decisions taken are at least as good
as any other possibility, so there are no ‘non-credible promises.’Formally:
Theorem 1 If (1.1) tg <n(the government opens the economy too early),
or (1.2) if tg ≥ n,b u ta − (Ce
n + CF) <C
p
t for all t ≤ tg − 1 (t h ep o -
litical costs are too high at the beginning), then there is a subgame perfect







,w h e r e






l=0 ∈ H is such that if the technology that
was in use at t was the national one, and sh(N,1) = T in the other case.
That is, both ﬁrms choose the same strategy in which, at any history they
decide to use the national technology. Therefore, both ﬁrms shut down at the
moment the economy opens, that is, at t = tg.
The second result is in correspondence with the following intuition. Even
if the political forces are in a minimal degree of coordination, in the sense
that by themselves are not the cause of bankruptcy, a suﬃcient degree of
impatience in a ﬁrm, makes the corresponding ﬁrm to ignore future possible
proﬁts, and then to decide not to adopt the new technology at the appropriate
moment, so at the moment the foreign ﬁrm enters the market, the national
ﬁrm shuts down. If that ﬁrm would like to adopt the new technology later,
this technology is not aﬀordable anymore, because of the presence of the
foreign ﬁrm. On the other hand, if it were the case that one ﬁrm is patient
enough and the other is suﬃciently impatient, then the patient one adopts
the new technology at the outset, and the other decides not to adopt the new
technology. Also, if both ﬁrms are suﬃciently impatient, both ﬁrms decide
not to adopt the new technology, and both shut down at the moment the
economy opens. Also, if these decisions are revised in future times, are not
changed, because there are no advantages in do it so and, furthermore, once
again, at any possible history, the decisions taken are at least as good as any
other possibility, so there are no ‘non-credible promises.’
For the sake of the exposition, we will now explain and deﬁne the strate-





h∈H the strategy of the impa-
tient ﬁrm. On the other hand, the patient ﬁrm that adopt the new technol-











h∈H is such that at any history at
which either the new technology is already installed or it is possible to ﬁnish
to install it, the patient ﬁrm adopt the new technology, otherwise it chooses





h∈H is such that at any history
at which the new technology is already installed or it is possible to ﬁnish to
install one period later, it prescribes to continue with the new technology;
otherwise it prescribes not to adopt the new technology if the technology in
use the previous period was the national one, and to continue with national
one in the other case.
In order to formally describe these strategies, the following deﬁnitions are
convenient:






t for all t ≤






l=0 ∈ H,f o rt h e
ﬁrm P, is such that the new technology ‘is possible to ﬁnish to install it from
the beginning, independently of the I’s strategy’ if aP
0 = T, aP
l = N for all
0 <l≤ t, aI
l ∈ {N,L} for all 0 ≤ l ≤ t and t<n ;D 1 . 2 )S i m i l a r l y ,w ew i l l






l=0 ∈ H,f o rt h eﬁrm P, is such that the new
technology is ‘completelly installed from the beginning, independently of the
I’s strategy’ if aP
0 = T, aP
l = N for all 0 <l≤ t, aI
l ∈ {N,L} for all 0 ≤ l ≤ t





















l +CFfor all n−1 ≥ l ≥ 1,a n dCP
l = Ce
n+CF
for all n ≤ l ≤ t.






t for all t ≤






l=0 ∈ H,f o rt h e
ﬁrm P, is such that the new thechnology is ‘ possible to ﬁnish to install it but
not from the beginning, independengly of the I’s strategy’ if the corresponding
sequence of costs satisﬁes that there is l1 such that 0 <l 1 <t , l1 + n ≤ tg,




l1 + CF,a n dCP
l1+k = Ce
k + CF for all k such that






l=0 ∈ H is
such that the ﬁrm P ‘has decided to completelly install the new technology
but not from the beginning, independengly of the I’s strategy’ if aI
l ∈ {N,L}






l=0 is the corresponding sequence of costs,







k+CF for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n−1,a n dCP
l = Ce
n+CF for all t ≥ l ≥ l1+n.
Now we deﬁne the following subsets of histories .
H
P
0 = {h ∈ H |h satisﬁes D1.1 or D1.2},( 2 )
which represents all the histories such that the patient ﬁrm decides, from the




1 = {h ∈ H |h satisﬁes D2.1, or D2.2 },( 3 )
which represents the set of all histories such that the new technology is
already installed, but not from the beginning, and it is under use from the
moment it was installed to the time period of the history in question.
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sI
h(N,2) = N if h = ∅
sI







0 and t<n− 1
sI







0 and t ≥ n − 1
sI







1 and t<l 1 + n − 1
sI







1 and t ≥ l1 + n − 1
sI
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     
     
sP
h(T)=T if h = ∅
sP
















l=0 / ∈ HP
0 ∪ HP
1 , CP
t = CN and t + n ≤ tg − 1
sP






l=0 / ∈ HP
0 ∪ HP
1 , CP
t = CN and t + n ≥ tg
sP











     
     
(5)
Analogous deﬁnitions apply changing I for P and P for I in (4) and (5)
respectively, where it proceeds.











t for all t ≤ tg − 1,t h e n :( 2 . 1 )I ft h e
ﬁrm I is suﬃciently impatient (β
I is small enough) and the other ﬁrm P is
suﬃciently patient (β











i sas u b g a m ep e r f e c tN a s he q u i l i b r i u m ;( 2 . 2 )I fb o t hﬁrms are suﬃciently










h∈H) is a subgame











h∈H) i sas u b g a m ep e r f e c tN a s he q u i l i b r i u m .
Some remarks in relation to the results obtained are in order.




l=0 is non de-
creasing” is too strong (albeit appealing). For si be {si
h(T)}h∈H (with i ∈
12{I,P}) in any of the equilibria given in the theorem 2, it is enough (and
necessary) to require that
¡
πi(Ce











≥ 0 for all l ≤ tg − 1.T h i s









0 for all l ≤ tg − 1.
Remark 3 When reading the proofs given in the Appendix, and taking into
acount the prevous remark, it is not diﬃcult to see that other equilibria exist.








l +CF,·)) ≥ 0
for all l ≤ tg − 1” is not satisﬁed. In such situations, that ﬁrm (the patient
one) installs the new technology, but not at the beginning (we remit to our
footnote 3). We omit the formal presentation of these possible equilibria since
they have the same ﬂavor as the case presented in the theorem 2.



















t for all 0 <t≤ tg − 1, the equilibria commented in
the previous remark disappear. In words, if a ﬁrm does not install the new
technology at t =0 , it will never be again proﬁtable to install it, independently
of the correspondent degree of patience. This result heavily highlight the path-
dependence problem that is present in the economic phenomenon described
in this paper: A given decision in the past, implies irreversible consequences
over the present and the future.
Remark 5 It is important to notice that the equilibrium given in (2.3) of
the theorem 2 can be part of a subgame perfect Nash equilibria in an extended
model in which the government is a player, even considering various diﬀerent
situations.5 Indeed, take that equilibrium and consider the following scenar-
ios:
5Given the potential richness and complexity of the suggested extended models, a
complete and detailed treatment of those medels is left for future reaserch. Not only it is
necessary to modify the notation of the model (strategies of the ﬁrms, histories, and player
functions), but also it may be the case that some of the equilibria obtained here will not
be subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in the corresponding extended model. For intstance,
it may be the case that there will be necessary some kind of coordination between the
ﬁrms. Also, notice that here we only present now what the government would do along
the equilibrium path.
13S1) Suppose that the government maximizes the consumer’s surplus (a dem-
agogic government, let’s say), therefore the value of the welfare of the society






































































































Therefore, the government opens the economy at t = tg as promised at t =0 .
Notice that this scenario may be considered the most probable ammong all
the possible ones: A demagogic government maximizing the probability of
winning the next elections, so that the ﬁrms will be willing to think that the
government will open the economy at the promised moment.
S2) Suppose that the government maximizes the welfare of the whole society,










































(here, the ﬁrst term is the consumer’s surplus, the sec-
ond term consists of the beneﬁts of the two national ﬁrms, and the third is





































































9)a2 +2 ( 1
9)a2 =
4
9a2; therefore, taking (CF,Ce






















Therefore, the government opens the economy at t = tg as promised at t =0 .
144C o n c l u s i o n s
The model developed in this paper suggests that even when a government
can credibly precommit to open-up the economy to foreign competition and
ﬁrms have perfect foresight of when that will happen, they may choose not
to invest in new technology. This is t h ec a s ew h e nu n i o n sa r et o os t r o n g ,
and thus the political costs ﬁrms face when they adopt the new technology
are too high, or/and when the time-period given by the government for trade
liberalization is too short, even when ﬁrms are suﬃciently patient. The same
result arises when ﬁrms are too impatient, regardless of political costs, or the
length of time-period before trade liberalization. However, when ﬁrms are
patient enough and there is political coordination in terms of the relation
between political costs and the time-period given before trade liberalization
national ﬁrms can adopt the new technology and successfully compete with
the foreign ﬁrm.
Our model, also, describes and incorporates the severe problem of path-
dependency in the sense commented in the remark 4: If the political costs
are increasing, as a result of the widening of the technology gap between
the national and the new technology, then it is important that ﬁrms choose
to adopt the new technology early, otherwise they will not be able to do it
later, and will close when the foreign ﬁrm enters. It raises, additionally, the
importance of credit markets given that if there are no credit opportunities,
the ﬁrms must close if the conditions that they face are adverse for the
adoption of the new technology. Conversely, if there are credit opportunities
the ﬁr m sm a ys u r v i v eo n c et h ef o r e i g nﬁrm enters the market even if they
had not invested in the new technology earlier.
In this paper we have not included the possibility that ﬁrms’ decisions
to invest or not to invest may aﬀect the time-period the government deﬁnes
before liberalization as Staiger and Tabellini (1987), Matsuyama ( 1990)
and Tornell (1991) have done. This could be an interesting extension to
this paper. Our remark 5 is giving an insight of one of the possible results
in this new scenario, one in which temporary protection is succefull and a
good decision for a government even if it is maximazing the welfare of the
whole society. However, since we consider two domestic ﬁrms instead of a
monopolist ﬁrm, as Matsuyama (1990) and Tornell (1991) do, it could show
the necessity of coordination between ﬁrms to follow a similar strategy in
order to generate the desired response from the government.
155 Appendix
First of all, we recall some well known results in relation to Cournot Com-
petence.
Lemma 1 Suppose that the inverse demand function is given by P(Q)=
a − Q.T h e n
a)If there are two ﬁrms facing constant marginal costs C1 and C2 that com-
pete à la Cournot, and a − Ci > 0 for i =1 ,2,t h e ni f(q1,q 2) denotes the





3 if a − Ci > a−Cj
2 for i,j ∈ {1,2}, i 6=,j
qi = a−Ci
2 ,qj =0 ,i fa − Cj ≤ a−Ci
2 for i,j ∈ {1,2}, i 6=,j
,
and the Cournot proﬁts of the ﬁrm ii ∈ {1,2,3} is given by πi(Ci,Cj)=( qi)
2
for i =1 ,2;a n d
b) If there are three ﬁrms facing constant marginal costs Ci with i =1 ,2 and
3 that compete á la Cournot, then if
¡
qk¢
k∈{1,2,3} denotes a Nash equilibrium,
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qi =0 ,q j = a−2Cj+Ck





and a − Cj > a−Ck






2 ,q j =0for j 6= i,i fa−Ci




the Cournot proﬁts of the ﬁrm i ∈ {1,2,3} is given by πi(Ci,C−i)=( qi)
2.
Proof: Routine and omitted.
F o ra l lt h ep r o o f sw ew i l lu s et h eo n e - s t a g ed e v i a t i o np r i n c i p l ef o ri n ﬁnite-
horizon games (theorem 4.2, in Fudenberg and Tirole (2002)).
1 P r o o fo ft h e o r e m1 .
1.1 The proof of (1.1).
Following Osborne and Rubinstein (1994), we introduce the following











l=0 ∈ H,t h e nΓ(˜ h)=
D






denote the subgame of Γ that follows the history ˜ h,w h e r eH|˜ h is the set of




∈ H, ˜ P
¯ ¯ ¯
˜ h




˜ P(˜ h,h0) for each h0 ∈ H|˜ h and Πi|˜ h is deﬁned by h0 is as least a good as
h00 if and only if (˜ h,h0) is as good as (˜ h,h00). Similarly, given a strategy s,





for each h0 ∈ H|˜ h.
With this notation in place, we proceed to the proof.




















i)tπi(CN,CN) > 0 for
i ∈ {I,P},s i n c eπi(CN,CN) > 0 (A1 and (a) in lemma 1) and πi(CN,CN,CF)=
0 ( A2 and (b) in lemma 1), and therefore both ﬁrms shut down at t = tg.






l=0 for t<t g − 1.T h i s h i s t o r y











˜ h) is such that the corresponding sequence






l=t+1,w h e r eCI
l = CP
l = CN for all
l ≥ t+1. Therefore, the payoﬀ of the player i from the subgame starting after












˜ h = 
      






























if t +1=tg − 1
,
(6)
because at l = tg the foreign ﬁrm enters the market and the two national
ﬁrms shut down at t = tg (recall the remark 1, and the fact that the time
period proﬁts of the both ﬁrms for l ≥ tg are πi(CN,CN,CF)=0 ,a sb e f o r e ) .
Now, under the alternative strategy ˜ si = {˜ si
h} given by ˜ si
h = sh(N) for all
17h 6= ˜ h and ˜ si
˜ h 6= s˜ h(N) –that is, {˜ si
h}h∈H
¯ ¯
˜ h ˜ si prescribes to adopt the new
technology, independently of the technology used at t, after the history ˜ h,









˜ h = 
      
































if t +1=tg − 1
,( 7 )
once again, because at l = tg the foreign ﬁrm enters the market (recall the
remark 1, and the fact that the time period proﬁts of the both ﬁrms for l ≥ tg
are πi(CN,CN,CF)=0 , as before). Now observe that, the cost associated to
the action ˜ si
˜ h , (denoted by Ci
t+1)i s s u c h t h a t Ci
t+1 ≥ (CF + Ce
t+1), because
of the political costs, and (CF +Ce
t+1) > (CF+ Ce
tg) >C N because t<t g−1,
n>t g (A3.1), and the economic costs are decreasing. Therefore we have 0=
πi(Ci








(˜ h). This concludes the proof when t<t g−1.






l=0 for t ≥ tg − 1,a n d






l=0. Firtst, we observe
the following:






l=0 may be such that the
foreign technology is adopted at some period before t by a ﬁrm i ∈ {I,P}.
F u r t h e r ,i tm a yb es u c ht h a tt>nand the foreign technology is adopted at
t =0 . Nevertheless, since tg <n , the costs corresponding to the periods from
tg to n−1 are not actually paid (the time-period proﬁts of that ﬁrm are zero).
Therefore, due to our assumptions (recall the remark 1), the payoﬀ Πi|˜ h of
any history h ∈ H|˜ h that prescribes to adopt with the foreign technology
will be such that the corresponding ﬁrm have to pay the costs of the foreign
technology as it would not have paid anything.
Then, in this last situation (t ≥ tg − 1), independently of the strate-
gies of the ﬁrms, both ﬁrms shut down at t = tg, given that they did
not have enough time to install the new technology and, to install the new
technology –completely– is the only way to survive at the moment the






















t) for all ˜ si = {˜ si
h}such
that ˜ si
h = sh(N) for all h 6= ˜ h and ˜ si
˜ h 6= s˜ h(N), due to the precedent remark.
The proof of 1.1 is done.
1.2 The proof of 1.2.














above. Consider now the payoﬀs Πi(({sh(N)}h∈H
¯ ¯













˜ h, which are given by (6) and (7) respectively,
and {˜ si
h}h∈H is given by ˜ si
h = sh(N) for all h 6= ˜ h and ˜ si
˜ h prescribes to
adopt the new technology independently of thecnology used at t.W e h a v e
then to compare πi(Ci
t+1,CN) with πi(CN,CN) (where Ci
t+1 denotes the cost
associated with the action ˜ si
˜ h). Now, given that t +1<t g and given ˜ si





t+1+CF,s i n c ea−(Ce
n+CF) <C
p
t for all t ≤ tg−1,
which implies that no costs of the new technology were paid before t+1 (r e c a l l
the remark 1). Given that the cost at t+1is Ce
0 +C
p
t+1 +CF,w eh a v eo n c e
again πi(Ci





the lemma 1 and the fact that the economic costs are decreasing). Hence,
πi(˜ si




























l=0 is the associated sequence of costs to ˜ h, we will have that
Πi(({sh(N)}h∈H
¯ ¯



















t) for all ˜ si = {˜ si
h}h∈H such that ˜ si
h = sh(N) for all h 6= ˜ h
and ˜ si
˜ h 6= s˜ h(N).I n d e e d ,
Πi(({sh(N)}h∈H
¯ ¯




˜ h is such that all the time-period Cournot
proﬁts after t are zero, since no costs of the new technology can be paid
at t<t g (because a − (Ce
n + CF) <C
p
















for all l ≥ tg, due to that, independently of the fact that the new technol-
ogy was or was not adopted before tg, we will have a−CF
2 ≥ a − Ci
l for all
19l ≥ tg (because of the lemma 1, A2 and A3.1)). For the same reason, we








˜ h is such that all the Cournot prof-
its after t are zero, and therefore, Πi(({sh(N)}h∈H
¯ ¯













˜ h as asserted.
The proof of the theorem 1 is done. ¥
2 P r o o fo ft h et h e o r e m2 .











h∈H) given by (4) and (5)





h∈H is such that, for any
˜ h ∈ H, {sh(N,2)}h∈H
¯ ¯
˜ h i sab e s tr e s p o n s et o{sh(T)}h∈H
¯ ¯
˜ h,p r o v i d e dt h a t
β
I is small enough.
Take ˜ h = ∅. Consider now the payoﬀs ΠI(({sh(N,2)}h∈H
¯ ¯























h∈H is such that ˜ sI
h =
sh(N,2) for all h 6= ˜ h and ˜ sI






to adopt the new technology at the beginning, but to adopt the national one
















      







































if n = tg
.
(8)
(once again, because the Cournot proﬁts for all t ≥ tg are πI(CN,Ce
n +
CF,CF)=0 ,d u et oA 2 ,A 3a n dt h el e m m a1 )a n d ,
20ΠI(({sh(N,2)}h∈H
¯ ¯




˜ h = 
      

































if n = tg
,
(9)



























0 +CF) <π I(CN,Ce
0 +C
p
0 +CF) (due to A3.1,
A3.2 and the lemma 1).
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if tg =1 .
(the same justiﬁcation as in (8) applies for both tg =1and tg > 1).
































0 + CF) > 0 (due to
A3.1 and A3.2). Therefore, we have proven the following statement:
If ˜ h = ∅, then there exist β
I






























such that ˜ sI
h = sh(N,2) for allh 6= ˜ h and ˜ sI
˜ h 6= s˜ h(N,2).

   
   
(10)







0 with t<n −1 (we suposse, for this case, that
n>1, otherwise there is nothing to prove). Thare are two cases, t<n− 2
and t = n − 2.I ft<n− 2,t h e n{sh(N,2)}h∈H prescribes to adopt the old





h∈H is such that
˜ sI
h = sh(N,2) for all h 6= ˜ h and ˜ sI
˜ h 6= s˜ h(N,2), then it prescribes to continue






l=t+1 the corresponding sequences of costs
of the patient ﬁrm (given ˜ h and {sh(T)}h∈H),6 we have that
ΠI(({sh(N,2)}h∈H
¯ ¯


































































(one more time, the same justiﬁcation as in (8) applies). Now, observe that
the diference ΠI(({sh(N,2)}h∈H
¯ ¯





6Note that the strategy of a ﬁrm i ∈ {I,P} is only deﬁn e di nt e r m so ft h es e t sHi
0 and
Hi
1. Therefore, the sequence of costs of a strategy, given a history h ∈ H,o faﬁrm, doos



















t+1)) > 0, due to that t +1<n− 1,A 3 . 1a n dt h el e m m a1 .T h ec a s e
when t<n− 2 is concluded.
Now suppose that t = n − 2.A g a i n ,{sh(N,2)}h∈H prescribes to use the







h = sh(N,2) for all h 6= ˜ h and ˜ sI
˜ h 6= s˜ h(N,2), then it prescribes to adopt
























































































(one more time, the same justiﬁcation as in (8) applies).
Then, the diference ΠI(({sh(N,2)}h∈H
¯ ¯
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if n = tg

          












> 0,d u et o
A3.1, A3.2 and the lemma 1. The case when t<n− 2 is concluded.














h = sh(N,2) for all h 6= ˜ h and ˜ sI
˜ h 6= s˜ h(N,2).I nt h i sc a s e ,{sh(N,2)}h∈H
¯ ¯
˜ h





















l=t+1 the corresponding sequences of costs of the patient ﬁrm (given
˜ h and {sh(T)}h∈H), we will have
ΠI(({sh(N,2)}h∈H
¯ ¯



























































l ) if t +1≤ tg − 1
0 if t +1>t g − 1
.
Now, we have that πI(Ce
n + CF,CP
n ) >π I(CN,CP
n ), since A2 and A3.3
imply that Ce
n + CF <C N.T h i sc o n c l u d e st h ec a s ew h e nt ≥ n − 1.
Then we have proven the following statement







































such that ˜ sI
h = sh(N,2) for all h 6= ˜ h and ˜ sI
˜ h 6= s˜ h(N,2).

    
    
(11)






1 with t ≥ l1+n−1 and t<l 1+n−1.T h e r e f o r e ,w eh a v e
24the following statement proven







































such that ˜ sI
h = sh(N,2) for all h 6= ˜ h and ˜ sI
˜ h 6= s˜ h(N,2).

    
    
(12)






l=0 / ∈ HI
0 ∪ HI
1 and CI






h∈Hsuch that ˜ sI
h = sh(N,2) for all h 6= ˜ h and ˜ sI
˜ h 6= s˜ h(N,2).
Therefore, {sh(N,2)}h∈H
¯ ¯
˜ h prescribes to adopt the national technology for








prescribes to adopt the foreign technology at t+1,






l=t+1 the corresponding sequences of costs of the patient ﬁrm (given































if t +1≤ tg − 1
0 if t +1>t g − 1
because, if
t +1≤ tg − 1 the corresponding sequences of costs difer only at t +1and,
if t +1>t g − 1, since the new technology neither was installed from the
beginning nor can be ﬁnished to install before tg which implies, due to the
remark 1 and A2, all the Cournot proﬁts after t +1are null. Therefore, the
following statement is proven




































such that ˜ sI
h = sh(N,2) for all h 6= ˜ h and ˜ sI
˜ h 6= s˜ h(N,2).

    
    
(13)







l=0 / ∈ HI
0 ∪ HI
1 and CI







h = sh(N,2) for all h 6= ˜ h and ˜ sI
˜ h 6= s˜ h(N,2). Therefore, the following
25statement is proven




































such that ˜ sI
h = sh(N,2) for all h 6= ˜ h and ˜ sI
˜ h 6= s˜ h(N,2).

    
    
(14)
Consequently, we the following statement is proven
There exist ˜ β
I
such that, if β
I < ˜ β
I
,i fh ∈ H,t h e r e f o r e ,
therefore, ΠI(({sh(N,2)}h∈H
¯ ¯
























such that ˜ sI
h = sh(N,2) for all h 6= ˜ h and ˜ sI
˜ h 6= s˜ h(N,2).

    
    
(15)
The proof follows at once from (10), (11), (12), (13) and (14).
An analogous reasoning can be used to prove the following statement
There exist ˜ β
P
such that, if ˜ β
P
<β



























such that ˜ sP
h = sh(T) for all h 6= ˜ h and ˜ sI
˜ h 6= s˜ h(T).

    
    
(16)
Therefore, in virtue of (15) and (16), the proﬀ of (2.1) in the theorem 2
is ﬁnished.
Remark 7 Notice that, as mentioned in the note 5, the strategies sI =





1 respectively. Therefore, the same arguments can
be used to pove (2.2) and (2.3) in the theorem 2.
The proof the the theorem 2 is concluded.
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